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Abstract: This article first conceptualizes the ASEAN Investment Regime (AIR) as an 
Interstate Cooperative Regime (ICR), defined as a stable interstate cooperative nexus 
on a particular regulative subject, comprising the regulation of foreign investment in 
this case. It then seeks to explain the evolution of AIR in terms of its identity formation. 
In doing so, this article employs three ideal types of cultural logic - Hobbesian, Lockean 
and Kantian - across each stage of AIR’s evolution, largely overlapping with the three 
main IR theories of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, respec-
tively. Using those models, we find a clear evolutionary pathway with the AIR following 
this sequential trajectory as it has transitioned towards a closer, regional investment 
community. This article nonetheless concludes that AIR’s organizational development 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the institutional turn in International Relations (IR) theory, schol-
ars have considered international organizations (IOs) such as the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to be important avenues for interna-
tional cooperation.1 Yet the state-oriented theories entrenched in the ration-
alist tradition often give short shrift to the ontology of IOs as independent 
entities, rather than as instruments of those states who founded them.2 This 
article aims to construct ASEAN’s identity qua organization as it probes 
ASEAN’s institutional evolution for the past several decades. Although 
ASEAN encompasses multiple economic and political dimensions, this arti-
cle focuses on ASEAN’s identity as it concerns the intra-regional investment 
regime. To the extent that the investment regime is an important factor driv-
ing economic integration among the ASEAN states, scrutinizing the 
ASEAN’s identity formation in that particular area offers a unique way of 
understanding ASEAN’s institutional development. 
To fully understand the ASEAN Investment Regime (AIR)’s organiza-
tional development, part of our chosen methodology is to anthropomorphize 
the investment regime so as to investigate its identity formation process using 
Erik Erikson’s identity theory. According to Erikson, an infant’s early iden-
tifications with its parents are subject to change as it encounters its peers in 
a later stage (adolescence). Critically, an adolescent undergoes an “identity 
crisis” before its genuine identity is formed. An identity crisis is a necessary 
step for an adolescent to establish autonomy as it adapts to various challenges 
 
 1  See, e.g., Nicholas Onuf, Institutions, Intentions and International Relations, 28 REV. INT’L STUD. 
211 (2002). 
 2  See Sungjoon Cho, An International Organization’s Identity Crisis, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 359 
(2014). 
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imposed by the environment. Likewise, while AIR aligned its early identifi-
cation (the “ASEAN Way”) with the original vision of its founders, AIR sub-
sequently formed a new identity (expansive investment liberalization) under 
external peer pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions. Then, it encoun-
tered a further (exogenous) crisis moment comprised of the devastating Asian 
financial crisis and the rise of China as a potential economic threat. It was 
only after the AIR experienced these diverse crises that it firmly constituted 
its collective, integrationist identity as an investment community, rather than 
as a loose arrangement among individual members. 
Interestingly, however, the AIR’s identity formation did not follow a 
simple linear process. Although it evolved from weak to stronger integration, 
its initial sovereigntist, inward-looking traits (ASEAN Way) remained stub-
bornly salient even in later stages. For example, the AIR’s most advanced 
development, the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA), envisions certain issue areas that remain largely unaffected by in-
vestment liberalization. This “encapsulated” identity,3 which is characterized 
by an undeniable gap between a supranational aspiration and an intergovern-
mental reality,4 appears to depart from the main thesis of identity-formation 
theory, and may reflect other theoretical frameworks, not least “path-depend-
ency.”5 
This article makes three main claims. First, it argues that conventional 
IR theories, such as neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism, do not offer a 
convincing macro model by which to identify and explain the evolution of 
an Interstate Cooperative Regime (ICR). It defines an ICR as a stable inter-
state cooperative nexus or relationship on a particular regulative subject, such 
as the treatment of investment within the AIR. Instead of these conventional 
theories, this article’s approach is one of constructivism which, given its 
structural and holistic nature, is better equipped to map an ICR’s evolution 
on questions of identify formation. Second, this article argues that because 
an ICR is an open, organic system that incessantly interacts with the environ-
ment, an ICR is destined to undergo an identity crisis at some point in its 
organizational development. An identity crisis provides an ICR with a valu-
able opportunity for organizational maturing and is therefore an essential 
 
 3  The notion of “encapsulation” in psychology means that an earlier form of identification remains 
unchallenged and thus unchanged (“encapsulated”) even in later stages of identify formation.  See e.g., 
Earl Hopper, Encapsulation as a Defence against the Fear of Annihilation, 72 INT’L J. PSYCHOANAL. 
607–24 (1991). 
 4  See David Martin Jones & Michael L.R. Smith, Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the 
Evolving East Asian Regional Order, 32 INT’L SECURITY 148, 184 (2007). 
 5  “Path-dependency” can be defined as a “process in which the structure that prevails after a specific 
moment in time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative 
institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would be more efficient ac-
cording to a standard expected utility model.”  Orfeo Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International 
Relations, 65 INT’L ORG. 367, 376 (2011). 
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juncture for its survival and maturation. Third, this article argues that certain 
properties in the initial identity of an ICR may remain largely unchanged 
even in a later stage of its identity formation. This phenomenon of an encap-
sulated identity tends to question the conventional identity formation theory 
and call for an alternative theoretical framework, such as historical institu-
tionalism.6 
This article proceeds in the following sequence. The Part II conceptual-
izes an ICR based on constructivism. It demonstrates why rationalism cannot 
fully capture an organizational structure of an ICR due mainly to its method-
ological individualism. Constructivism enables a holistic investigation of the 
AIR and therefore offers an especially useful analytical tool for the purpose 
of this article. It then introduces Erik Erikson’s identity-formation theory to 
undertake a dynamic investigation on the evolution of AIR. Part III applies 
constructivism and identify-formation theory to AIR and explains its organ-
izational development process. It illustrates how the AIR evolved from a 
loose interstate arrangement to an investment community. Part IV argues that 
AIR’s organizational development was not linear and that one can detect sov-
ereigntist regressionism in certain areas.7 
 II. CONCEPTUALIZING AN INTERSTATE COOPERATIVE 
REGIME 
To truly understand the evolution of the ASEAN investment regime, we 
must first choose a conceptual or theoretical framework. Such a framework 
may represent a micro foundation focusing on individual members and their 
interactions or a macro foundation concerning a systematic, organizational 
structure. Conventional IR theories8 mostly adopt the micro framework. 
Agency-oriented theories, such as neorealism, rational choice theory and ne-
oliberal institutionalism, adopt methodological individualism (state-ori-
ented). Based on a Hobbesian view of international anarchy, neorealists 
adopt something of a dismissive view of ICR, in particular trivializing its 
 
 6  One might make a reasonable observation that the ASEAN Way has exerted a much stronger influ-
ence on security cooperation in ASEAN than on initiatives directed at economic cooperation. See Beverly 
Loke, The ‘ASEAN Way’: Towards Regional Order and Security Cooperation?, 30 MELB. J. POL. 8 
(2006); Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist Assessment, 3 INT’L 
REL. ASIA-PAC. 57, 59 (2003). 
 7  A word of caution is in order. This article does not address the ASEAN as a whole, but only its 
investment regime (AIR). AIR is entitled as a subject of serious investigation as a separate system–both 
functionally and culturally–distinct from the ASEAN in its entirety. Likewise, there could be other oper-
ational areas of ASEAN, such as security, that might or might not warrant the same approach as the one 
this article adopts. Therefore, the ASEAN’s identity in terms of security may exhibit different properties 
from the one discussed here, although the two identities could be interrelated. 
 8  Regarding various strands of IR theories, see generally SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF WORLD TRADE: NORMS, COMMUNITY AND CONSTITUTION (2015).  
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constitutive infrastructure, such as international law and institutions.9 To 
them, any interstate cooperation is tantamount to a mere “epiphenomenon of 
underlying power” or a “coincidence of state interests or coercion by power-
ful states.”10 
Informed by an economic methodology, rational choice theory views 
any institution as a program or script that ex ante maps out actors’ rational 
strategies as well as their results.11 These institutions bind and shape actors’ 
behaviors only because choices over them can be measured and predicted 
through a rational (cost-benefit) analysis.12 In this regard, an ICR may be 
seen as a welfare-maximizing contract in which states’ interests and prefer-
ences determine various institutional choices.13 The theoretical assumption 
behind rational choice theory leads naturally to a proposition that a state will 
respect an ICR if and only if, its payoff from compliance (cooperation) is 
greater than the cost incurred through such compliance.14 In other words, co-
operation is a result of a complicated calculation on various utilities (such as 
positive reputation and reciprocal cooperation by others) and disutilities 
(such as negative reputation and penalties).15 
Neoliberal institutionalism shares a set of premises with neorealism and 
rational choice theory. As neorealists do, neoliberal institutionalists’ main 
analytical focus is individual actors (states).16 Meanwhile, similar to rational 
choice theorists, neoliberal institutionalists argue that individual actors 
(states) basically pursue competing interests, subject to various (material and 
non-material) constraints.17 Based on an integrated view of a domestic and 
international sphere,18 neoliberal institutionalists’ main concern is how to co-
ordinate diverging domestic preferences with a minimum cost. In this sense, 
 
 9  See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 64, 73–76 (2006); see also KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 (1979); 
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, 
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–37, 118, 225 (2005). 
 10  Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 9, at 74–75. 
 11  See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS (Sarah A. Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes & Bert A. Rockman, eds., 2008). 
 12  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (using the 
“transaction cost” approach in analyzing institutions); DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (James Alt & Douglas North eds., 1990). 
 13  See generally Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade 
Organization, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 321 (2012). 
 14  See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 55–
60 (2008). 
 15  See id. at 36–40, 45, 47–48. 
 16  See Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative 
Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 681–83 (2001).  
 17  See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 
51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516 (1997). 
 18  Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 240, 241 
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an ICR can be an important avenue to facilitate such coordination by creating 
norms, supplying useful information and monitoring compliance.19 
The aforementioned conventional IR theories are collectively coined 
“rationalism” in that they presuppose isotropic, rational actors (states) whose 
actions are guided by a common thesis of substantive rationality represented 
by efficiency, power and interest.20 While these conventional IR theories of-
fer useful heuristics in understanding the origin of an ICR (explaining why 
states cooperate at first instance), they cannot fully capture the complex 
“changes” that an ICR makes over time. The paradigms provided by conven-
tional IR theories are necessarily functional and therefore inherently static. 
Their characteristic methodological individualism adopts states (agency) as 
a primary analytical unit.21 Under this view, an ICR is merely an instrument 
that serves various utilitarian functions that rational states would desire, such 
as providing information, reducing uncertainties, and monitoring cheating.22 
Under functionalism, the only occasion in which states are compelled to re-
tool their ICRs is when they face extreme external shocks, such as catastro-
phes.23 This functionalism hardly accords an ICR its ontological autonomy24 
that enables us to observe its postcreation evolution process in which an ICR 
adapts itself, on its own terms, to environmental challenges.25 In sum, con-
ventional IR theories may offer various functional snapshots of an ICR, but 
not its panoramic identity qua organization. 
Moreover, as long as ICRs are viewed as tools, their unique institutional 
contexts tend to be underappreciated. As Gayl Ness and Steven Brechin aptly 
observe, “[ICRs] differ over time, or . . . they perform differently from one 
another, or . . . they achieve their ends with varying effectiveness or effi-
ciency.”26 Thus, conventional IR theories cannot fully capture the various 
 
(2000). 
 19  ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (viewing that international institutions facilitate decentralized cooperation 
among state actors). 
 20  Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 386–87 
(1988).  
 21  Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30 REV. INT’L STUD. 289, 299 
(2004) (“We-intentions are nothing but interlocking I-intentions toward a group.”). 
 22 See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Interna-
tional Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); see also THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 3–4 (1991) (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Anna Gran-
dori, Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency Constructs in the Economics and Sociology of Organiza-
tions, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION STUDIES 61 (Siegwart M. Lindenberg & 
Hein Schreuder eds., 1993). 
 23  See Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and 
Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 662 (2006). 
 24 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 22, at 704. 
 25 Helfer, supra note 23, at 662. 
 26  Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organiza-
tions, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 247 (1988). 
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contexts of each ICR endemic to its unique subject-matter, history and cul-
ture. 
Therefore, we need a new theoretical framework through which we can 
conceptually embrace the ontological autonomy of an ICR so that we can 
investigate its dynamic institutional development. An ICR’s institutional de-
cision, or collective consciousness, cannot be the result of an aggregation of 
the interests of its individual member states. Although its member states are 
building blocks of an ICR, an ICR “emerges” on its own, rather than is simply 
created by those states.27 In this regard, a sociology-led approach, especially 
constructivism, distinguishes itself from those conventional IR theories as it 
highlights a social structure, rather than agency, that constructs the culture 
and identities of those actors.28 Constructivists emphasize ideational factors, 
such as culture and norms, that guide state actions from within.29 States build 
a collective identity as they share common goals and norms. Such a collective 
identity often bonds those participating states, with or without material in-
centives, and enables cooperation among them. In this regard, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that: 
The resolutely positivist . . . approach of international law . . . has 
been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law 
more readily seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and 
respond to the social necessities of States organized as a community.30 
This “collective juridical conscience” is a normative manifestation of 
social identity that cannot be reduced to a mere aggregation of individual, 
subjective intentionalities.31 Once we conceptualize an ICR as an autono-
mous institution or structure that is ontologically independent from its crea-
tors (states), we can observe its development (evolution) in a dynamic fash-
ion. 
Here, a note of caution is in order. Although this collective bond gener-
ates an “ontological security”32 among states and provides a source of coop-
eration within an ICR, these intersubjective qualities of social interaction 
should not be equated with cooperation itself. As witnessed in the Cold War, 
 
 27  Wendt, supra note 21, at 301, 304. 
 28  Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutional-
ism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 333 (1996). 
 29  See generally, ALEXANDER WENDT, THE SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999). 
 30  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 268, 270–
71, ¶13 (July 8) (Declaration of President Bedjaoui) (emphasis added). 
 31  See Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework, 
in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 3 (Judith Goldstein & 
Robert Keohane eds., 1993) (observing that ideas, as well as material interests, shape behavior and noting 
the impact of beliefs shared by large numbers of people, such as world views). 
 32  See generally Jennifer Mitzen, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Se-
curity Dilemma, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 341 (2006). 
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social dynamics can be conflictual.33 Neither should consequences of social 
interaction be necessarily celebratory: even slavery and Apartheid were once 
social norms.34 
Markedly, the recent development of public international law has coun-
tenanced an ICR’s ontological autonomy in the form of “legal personality.” 
As a departure from its traditional obsession with state sovereignty, postwar 
international law is characterized by the prominence of a thick set of IOs. 
Although the legal status of an IO was deeply contentious in the prewar pe-
riod,35 a number of postwar IOs (such as the UN and the WTO) explicitly 
claimed their autonomous legal personalities separate from their member 
states.36 Now, an IO (ICR) is a “subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties.”37 Likewise, such legal personality 
is deemed to be inextricably linked to a unique institutional specialty of each 
IO (ICR).38 This specialty-laden legal personality promotes the “mentalités 
collectives” within an ICR by professionalizing its daily operation, relatively 
detached from direct interventions from the headquarters.39 Juridical person-
hood tends to also bestow upon an IO (ICR) an institutional compass, in the 
form of object and purpose, by which it can maintain its permanency. In other 
words, an IO, and the ICR it espouses, can secure its survival through persis-
tent normative engagement with, and even transformation of, its object and 
purpose. For example, an IO (ICR) brings meanings to its operation by inter-
preting various situations, such as disputes, based on the object and pur-
pose.40 
While constructivism provides a theoretical underpinning of an ICR’s 
organizational autonomy, we need another theoretical framework in which 
we can explain: first, when and how certain institutional changes transpire, 
 
 33  Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 384, 386 (1994).  
 34  MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 128 (1996); AUDIE 
KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 19–20 (1995). 
 35  See Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International Commission of Cape Spar-
tel Lighthouse, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (1931). 
 36  U.N. Charter, art. 104; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 
15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 14, (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].  
 37  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 
I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of International Organizations, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.shtml (last updated Sept. 19, 2016); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations (2011), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/eng-
lish/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf. 
 38  The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1 
I.C.J. Rep. 226 (1996). 
 39  John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Rela-
tions, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993). 
 40  See Cho, supra note 2, at 381, 390.  
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and second, what kinds of changes take place in the process of an ICR’s in-
stitutional development. Here, one critical aspect of an ICR’s institutional 
development is that as an autonomous organization, an ICR incessantly in-
teracts with its surrounding environment for its growth and survival. The en-
vironment is a source for both resources and a threat to an organic entity like 
an ICR. Harnessing and adapting to its environment is essential to an ICR’s 
survival.41 
Here, the identity formation theory in developmental psychology can be 
a plausible candidate in explaining an ICR’s evolution as a dynamic process 
of its adaption to its environment. Admittedly, this particular interdiscipli-
nary attempt—an IR theory (constructivism) borrowed from psychology—is 
not without controversies.42 Put simply, an IO cocooning an ICR is not a 
complex human being. As Alexander Wendt observes, a corporate identity 
might not be of the same quality as that of a human being as a biological 
entity.43 Nonetheless, this particular form of anthropomorphism is still con-
ceivable in particular dimensions, especially considering the open opera-
tional structure shared by an IO and a human being: as an organic system, 
both an IO (juridical person) and a natural person must interact with their 
respective environments.44 Maintaining a meaningful whole or integrity (that 
is, an identity) is a serious constitutive process both to an IO and an individ-
ual. Indeed, business administration scholars have already embraced this no-
tion of corporate identity in illuminating the life cycle of a corporation.45 
Against this background, Erik Erikson’s identity formation theory ap-
pears to offer a useful analogy for understanding an ICR. For Erikson, a hu-
man being’s (subjective) identity is negotiated with that person’s understand-
ing of its (objective) social environment.46 Erikson’s identity formation 
model presupposes various stages that an individual developmentally expe-
riences in his or her lifetime. Each stage is characterized by “its own set of 
 
 41 See RICHARD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 57 (3d ed. 
1992); Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in ROBERT MERTON ET AL., SOCIOLOGY TODAY 
404–05 (1959). 
 42  See Cho, supra note 2, at 376–78. 
 43  WENDT, supra note 29, at 221. 
 44  WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY 50 (1967). 
 45  See Dennis Bromley, Relationships between Personal and Corporate Reputation, 35 EUR. J. 
MARKETING 316, 318 (2001) (observing the tendency to “personify” an organization); Stuart Albert & 
David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, in 7 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 265 (L. L. 
Cummings & B. M. Staw eds., 1985); Peter Gorb, The Psychology of Corporate Identity, 10 EUR. MGMT. 
J. 310, 312 (1992); Henry Mintzberg, Power and Organizational Life Cycles, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 207, 
210 (1984); Andrew D. Brown & Ken Starkey, Organizational Identity and Learning: A Psychodynamic 
Perspective, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 102, 104 (2000); Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational Identity, 
Image, and Adaptive Instability, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 63, 65 (2000). 
 46 See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968); see also Willem L. 
Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and Education, in THE YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1995). 
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circumstances of particular sensitivity, identity crisis, and potential.”47 Erik-
son observed that: 
Identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and 
observation, a process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, 
by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he per-
ceived to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to them-
selves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way 
of judging him in the light of how he perceived himself in comparison 
to them and to types that have become relevant to him.48 
An adolescent defines his or her own existence as he or she transitions 
from childhood to adulthood.49 At the end of adolescence, an individual per-
son replaces his or her earlier identifications (with parents or other admirable 
adults) with a new identity resulting from socialization that reflects that per-
son’s own unique value system.50 Yet, this identity formation process is not 
necessarily uneventful. Adolescents often experience “a war within them-
selves”51 as they suffer from multiple identifications and the role confusion 
therefrom.52 It is only after they survive this rite of passage that they finally 
discover their place in society.53 
An ICR, just like an individual person, is given its original institutional 
DNA from its creators (states). An organizational history of an ICR starts 
with the founding member states. The initial goals those member states in-
tended to achieve through that ICR leaves a deep, if not indelible, path-de-
pendency within the ICR. Particular texts or arrangements engraved in an 
initial form of ICR tend to determine or explain what may be permitted or 
prohibited in the ICR’s institutional manifestations. For example, as stipu-
lated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), “preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion” may guide that 
treaty regime (ICR)’s present or future activities.54 
Yet, as the ICR responds to various challenges given by its environment, 
these institutional vestiges may lessen or even become obsolete. The ICR is 
often forced to “bring organizational structure, culture, and purpose in line 
with perceived environmental requirements.”55 Erikson’s identity theory 
 
 47 Cho, supra note 2, at 374; ERIKSON, supra note 46, at 91–141 (describing the different stages of 
the human life cycle). 
 48  ERIKSON, supra note 46, at 22–23. 
 49  ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, 156–65 (W.W. Norton 1963) (1950). 
 50 Id. at 155. 
 51  ERIKSON, supra note 46, at 17. 
 52  ERIKSON, supra note 49, at 163–64. 
 53 Id. at 161. 
 54  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 55  Matthias Finger & Bérangère Ruchat, The Transformation of International Public Organizations: 
The Case of UNCTAD 3 (Institut de Hautes Etudes en Administration Publique, Working Paper No. 
14/2000, 2000); see also HOWARD E. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 252–55 (1979). 
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aptly captures this struggle with the environment and a subsequent adaption 
as an “identity crisis.” An ICR can be said to form its unique identity as it 
assimilates complex information from its broader environment. Importantly, 
the legal personality of an IO enshrining an ICR tends to facilitate such ad-
aptation process. Social interactions within an IO are mediated by discourse 
and communication among member states. As a juridical person, discourse 
and communication within an IO are based on normative goals and legal 
principles.56 If an ICR is forced to modify its initial raison d’etre after an 
identity crisis, such modification will be accompanied invariably by some 
kind of legal change, such as amendment or teleological interpretation. The 
World Bank’s widely documented “mission creep” is a case in point.57 The 
World Bank’s original mission was a narrow goal of facilitating economic 
development as stipulated in Article I of its Charter (Articles of Agreement). 
Subsequently, however, social pressures from its various constituencies 
forced the World Bank to adopt an evolutionary interpretation of Article I 
that turned that narrow mission into a broad vision, requiring it to consider 
such diverse impacts as heath, education, environment, and women’s rights.58 
 III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ASEAN INVESTMENT REGIME 
The aforementioned IR theories provide useful analytical lenses through 
which one can understand the evolution of the ASEAN investment regime 
(AIR) in its true dynamic fashion. Each theoretical framework, be it neoreal-
ism, neoliberal institutionalism, or constructivism, can shed its distinct light 
on the AIR and its practices. Yet, relying entirely on insights offered by a 
single theory risks generating only a static snapshot of the regime, neglecting 
its panoramic nature. In this regard, this article attempts to match theoretical 
insights against temporal contexts by choosing and employing a given theory 
(at particular points in time) that is best equipped to capture the correspond-
ing identity and properties of the regime. In that way, we seek to dynamically 
use identity formation theory to map and explain the sequential development  
  
 
 56 See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). 
 57 See, e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (2001) (arguing 
that member countries of the World Bank should control the currently unwieldy status of mission creep 
by devolving some of its derivative missions to other institutions and focus more on original, basic mission 
of the Bank); Sarah Babb & Ariel Buira, Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion in Sociological 
Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality (Mar. 9, 2004),  http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20070719172319/http://www.g24.org/012gva04.pdf (discussing the IMF’s expanded mandate over the 
years). 
 58 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations: The Case of the 
World Bank, 2 J. HIS. INT’L L. 217, 249 (2000); Georg Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, in THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A COMMENTARY 28 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing 
“evolutionary dynamic interpretation”). 
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of the regime. 
In describing a macro structure (culture) in each stage of AIR’s organi-
zational development, we adopt metaphoric representations, such as Hobbes-
ian, Lockean and Kantian, developed by Alexander Wendt.59 This metaphor 
signifies a dominant role, such as adversary, competitor, and fellow, that each 
developmental stage may assign in the Self-Others configuration. These are 
not necessarily empirical manifestations at each stage, but highly abstract 
ideal types of structural logic that hold unique explanatory power in social, 
rather than material, terms.60 In general, these three cultures parallel neoreal-
ism (Hobbesian), neoliberal institutionalism (Lockean), and constructivism 
(Kantian), respectively. Although these three cultures tend to demonstrate a 
sequential development—from Hobbesian to Lockean to Kantian—a later 
stage may still retain certain theoretical properties from an earlier stage, de-
pending on degrees of norm internalization.61 For example, as discussed be-
low, AIR’s last stage in its organizational development (Kantian culture) still 
holds neorealist traits, such as internal sovereignty (suspicion of Others or an 
inward-looking mentality). Likewise, constructivism can even explain the 
Hobbesian culture as shared conflictual, not cooperative, ideas.62 
 A. The Sovereigntist Foundation (1950’s – 1970’s) 
Turning to ASEAN, any inquiry into the creation of the collective rules 
governing foreign investment obviously requires assessment of the bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) entered into by individual member states within 
ASEAN. Much of that BIT network temporally predates the construction of 
the ASEAN investment treaties, and thus operates as the legal and conceptual 
scaffolding for the construction of those dedicated collective rules. The his-
toriography of those BITs is marked by features common to the investment 
treaty universe such as the original desire by capital-exporting states to use 
BITs to counter downward shifts in protection of foreign property under cus-
tomary international law.63 But from the specific perspective of the Asian 
states (as capital-importing countries in this unsettled period), their general 
approach to foreign investors (and by extension, international investment 
law) was characterized by a deep-seated desire to acquire and defend state 
sovereignty.64 Here the insights of Erikson’s theory can already be produc-
 
 59  See WENDT, supra note 29, at 247. 
 60  In this sense, the social approach this article takes is distinguishable from Kenneth Waltz’s tradi-
tional realist (materialist) one that emphasizes distribution of power or capabilities. See id. at 249. 
 61  See id. at 250. 
 62  See id. at 255. 
 63  ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES – 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 18–44  (2009). 
 64  Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence About International Law & Institutions: Past, Present and 
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tively employed. In the early development period, infants find first identifi-
cation with their parents.65 
Likewise, the original intentions and disposition of its framers (ASEAN 
members) heavily influenced ASEAN’s early institutional format. The col-
lective memory of colonialism and postcolonial political and economic chaos 
borne by ASEAN members imbued its members with an obsession with sur-
vival and worst-case scenarios. As long as each member views another mem-
ber as a potential adversary, negative reciprocity tends to prevail and com-
plicates cooperation. This adversarial dimension is aptly illustrated by the 
violent conflict of “Konfrontasi” that stemmed from Indonesia’s opposition 
to the amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the crown 
colony/British protectorates of North Borneo and Sarawak.66 Spanning 1963 
to 1966, Konfrontasi was triggered by Indonesia’s increasingly aggressive 
postcolonial foreign policy in the period, leading to overt and covert military 
operations in the region with hundreds of casualties.67 In the economic 
sphere, too, we find similar levels of suspicion (albeit directed largely out-
wards at former colonial powers) and attachment to sovereignty. Not surpris-
ingly then, the early stages of investment rules only occasioned weak levels 
of cooperation among the ASEAN states. 
To begin with, the immediate decades following the Second World War 
were marked by a wave of forced takings of foreign assets throughout the 
developing world.68 Expropriation was no longer an isolated and exceptional 
event; its frequent invocation reflected a fundamental realignment of inter-
state interests. An array of peoples and groups demanded political independ-
ence from the strictures of colonial power relations, including those within 
Asia. The demand for political independence was not surprisingly accompa-
nied by a desire for economic sovereignty. Yet, the productive capacity of 
many of these states remained dependent on infrastructure and investment 
from former colonial powers. Foreign investment came in turn to be seen as 
a continuing proxy for colonialism with expropriation being used as a visible 
mechanism to complete the decolonization process. Formal laws passed to 
effect nationalization were often explicitly targeted at enterprises of the for-
mer colonial power. Thus, the 1958 Indonesian nationalization law was di-
rected solely at Dutch enterprises.69 The political sensitivity of the priority 
 
Futures, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945, 947–51 (2016). 
 65  See ERIKSON, supra note 46, at 115. 
 66  See generally J.A.C. MACKIE, KONFRONTASI: THE INDONESIA – MALAYSIA DISPUTE 1963–66 
(1974). 
 67  Id.  
 68  See THOMAS L. BREWER & STEPHEN YOUNG, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 52–53 (1998). 
 69  See Martin Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 305, 305–06 (1960) (extracting the meaning of the Indonesian Act No. 86 of 1958 concerning the 
nationalization of Dutch-owned enterprises within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia). 
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accorded to national ownership of state assets often transcended the immedi-
ate project of expelling nationals of the former colonial power. Wells and 
Ahmed capture this heightened sensitivity in their case analysis of Indone-
sia’s much later nationalization (in the late 1970s) of a telecommunications 
satellite facility constructed by ITT. Writing of the political sensitivity of the 
pro-investor clauses in the initial infrastructure contract, the authors percep-
tively note: 
[O]ne may dismiss a critique of these non-economic issues as “emo-
tional.” But in the real world, these very issues can cause discontent 
and conflict, particularly in countries that believe they have been sub-
ject to long periods of colonial suppression and exploitation – a feeling 
that was alive in Indonesia at the time. Although it found little voice 
in the tightly controlled press, that feeling would erupt in riots target-
ing Japanese investments in 1974.70 
The push to expropriate was further driven by the spread of alternative 
political models during this period. States that had adopted Marxist principles 
were hostile to all forms of private property, whether foreign or domestic. 
But even for other states, hostility to foreign investment is a natural conse-
quence of strategies employed to achieve developmental outcomes. For in-
stance, the tendency of most ASEAN states through the 1950s to 1970s was 
to engage in import substitution as a means of transitioning to a particular 
level of industrialization.71 The import substitution model posited develop-
ment of indigenous industrial capacity as the primary mechanism for coun-
tries to achieve comparative advantage in manufactured trade.72 Such an in-
digenous industry was to be nurtured through restrictions on competitive 
imports73 but constraints on entry of foreign investors (who would also act as 
potential competitors to domestic industry) were a further necessary comple-
ment to this program. 
The common outcome of these diverse tensions is a general opposition 
 
 70  LOUIS T. WELLS & RAFIQ AHMED, MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT SAFE: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 38 (2007); see AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET 
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 120–21 (2003) (on the parallel be-
tween colonialism and the modern phenomenon of “market-dominant minorities”). 
 71  For an overview of the influence of import substitution-based theory on development strategies 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, see MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 486–88 (3rd ed., 2005). 
 72  For a historical overview of the origins and influence of the infant industry argument from Alex-
ander Hamilton, Friedrich List to John Stuart Mill, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 116–37 (1996).  
 73  The dominance of this view of development is even reflected in post-war efforts to multilateralize 
trade liberalization. The GATT 1947 countenances the use of trade barriers to nurse indigenous infant 
industry. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVIII(2), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1,700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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in developing states—albeit at different degrees—to the free entry and oper-
ation of foreign investment in this period. This generated significant political 
conflict between capital importing and exporting states on whether and how 
traditional customary international rules should apply to newer instances of 
forced taking of foreign property and particularly nationalization of indus-
try.74 Despite these significant advances in the multilateral sphere, these same 
states began to slowly enter into bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with cap-
ital exporting states to govern regulation of foreign investment. The first BIT 
was concluded between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959,75 and soon 
thereafter, other European nations followed suit by building their own BIT 
programs.76 Yet, in comparison to the frenetic treaty making of later periods, 
BIT growth throughout the 1960s to 1970s proceeded at a “largely desultory 
pace.”77 There were only 72 BITs signed between 1959 and 1969, half of 
which were concluded by Germany.78 The pace of negotiations accelerated 
slightly throughout the 1970s with a further 166 BITs concluded by the end 
of 1979.79 
The problem then in this early period is one of strident political and 
ideological conflict between developing and developed states. With this in 
mind, BITs play an important role over and above the immediate functional 
goal (for host states) of attracting foreign capital. They also represent a mech-
anism by which treaty partners could anticipate and manage the deep schisms 
concerning political ideology and variances in economic models. Specifi-
cally, BITs have a function of depoliticizing and preventing escalation of in-
terstate conflict by carving out a zone of protection for foreign economic ac-
tors.80 Newly independent states (including those in Asia) could use entry 
into BITs to signal that, regardless of the level of experimentation in devel-
opment strategy, their overall political program was not driven by Marxism 
or its variants. In return, the major powers would refrain from various strat-
egies of covert intervention and tolerate—at the margins—economic models 
that deviated from preferred liberal precepts. The zone of protection in the 
 
 74  See, e.g., S.N. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of 
Universal International Law? 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 863, 866–86 (1961); C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 128–31 (1967). 
 75  NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 63, at 42. 
 76  Between 1960 and 1966, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden and Switzerland all concluded their first BITs. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 
International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and The Way Forward, 11, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3 (Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Series on International Investment]. 
 77  Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 621, 627 (1998).  
 78  U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 75, at 1–5. 
 79  UNCTAD, Series on International Investment, supra note 70, at 13. 
 80  For a similar account of the early BIT movement but one that focuses on “tribunalization” to man-
age interstate political and ideological conflict, see Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribu-
nalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.J. INT’L L. & POL. 959 (2009).  
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typical BIT model of this period assumes—not without cause—an embedded 
hostility to foreign investors in the domestic political and judicial processes 
of host states. 
In sum, the unique collective historical consciousness that derived from 
the colonial past and internal struggle within some states (Konfrontasi) em-
bedded a strong ideology of non-interference and self-determination among 
ASEAN members (the “ASEAN Way”).81 This centrifugal political ideology 
compounded the difficulties of seeking intra-ASEAN investment liberaliza-
tion as each ASEAN member sought to retain firm control of investment 
flows in and out of its own territory. Protectionist policies (such as through 
import substitution) are a natural reflection of this general goal as they deter 
foreign investment in areas where there is potential competition and conflict 
with domestic rivals. 
 B. The Lockean Expansion (1980s – 1990s) 
According to Erikson’s identity-formation theory, an adolescent defines 
his or her own existence (identity) as he or she incessantly explores his or her 
right place in the society.82 The adolescent experiments with various roles 
and replaces earlier identifications with parents with a new identity as he or 
she socializes and competes with peers.83 The AIR’s embrace of neoliberal 
prescriptions in the 1980–90s can be understood as its members’ socializa-
tion with peers (such as the Asian “tigers”) as well as with global institutional 
partners (such as the IMF and the World Bank). The Zeitgeist of the Wash-
ington Consensus pushed the AIR from old inward-looking development 
strategies to trying to find identification with the ideological preferences of 
the Bretton Woods institutions. AIR’s functionalist appeal, such as invest-
ment liberalization of both intra- and extra-ASEAN region, reflected a 
Lockean culture as its members demonstrated a limited trust among them-
selves based on self-interest. Nonetheless, cooperation remained fragile 
given stubborn vestiges of mercantilist competition. Paradoxically, intra-
ASEAN investment liberalization was preceded by extra-ASEAN invest-
ment liberalization conducted by a web of BITs signed between individual 
ASEAN members and developed countries. 
By the 1980s, a broad array of political and economic factors had begun 
 
 81  Lee Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order 
(Nuffield College Politics Group Working Paper, Mar. 2009) (regarding the history of the ASEAN Way); 
see also Gillian Goh, The ‘ASEAN’ Way: Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management, 
3 STAN. J. EAST ASIAN AFF. 113 (2003) (shedding a positive light on the ASEAN Way); Vinod K. Ag-
garwal & Jonathan T. Chow, The Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-Regime Undermines Eco-
nomic and Environmental Cooperation, 17 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 262 (2010) (shedding a negative light 
on the ASEAN Way).  
 82 ERIKSON, supra note 49, at 261–63. 
 83 Id. at 155. 
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to coalesce that forced and shaped change in the investment policy pursued 
by ASEAN members. Firstly, expropriation declined sharply as now inde-
pendent states had largely completed the postcolonial project of acquiring 
control of natural resources and infrastructure.84 Second, many of those states 
had begun to move away from political and developmental models predicated 
on opposition to foreign and private capital. The continuing feasibility of the 
import substitution approach to economic development had always depended 
on its ability to generate successful and competitive industrial champions. 
Yet by the late 1980s, it became clear that this model was producing disap-
pointing results for those countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America) that had chosen this development path.85 On the other hand, 
policies linked to export growth and market openness had led to demonstra-
ble economic growth in the newly industrializing “tiger” states of East Asia.86 
Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened the case for Marxism 
as a realistic alternative to economic and political liberalism. And finally, the 
sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s reduced developing state access to private 
bank loans. Unable to borrow to finance policies of economic development, 
developing states increasingly sought to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for their development needs. 
The net effect of these trends was the emergence of, as Vandevelde aptly 
describes it, “a consensus in the developing world about the desirability of 
attracting foreign investment through free market policies”.87 This is illus-
trated firstly and sharply by the direction of changes in domestic laws. States 
take unilateral steps to liberalize domestic restrictions on the entry and oper-
ation of foreign investment throughout the 1990s. Between 1991 and 2006, 
out of 2,533 national legal and regulatory changes relevant to foreign invest-
ment, 91% were in the direction of making the host country more favorable 
for FDI.88 This trend encompassed widespread expansion in practices of pos-
itive discrimination as both developed and developing states offer locational 
 
 84  Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy 1980 - 1992, 25 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 177 (1994) (discussing the reduction of expropriations of foreign assets amongst 
developing countries). 
 85  For an overview of the policy failures associated with import substitution, see TREBILCOCK & 
HOWSE, supra note 71, at 486–87.  
 86  These countries, though, did not by any means simply adopt policies of unconstrained market lib-
eralization. Some of them offered a range of targeted industrial policies including export incentives to 
specific firms. South Korea for instance prominently used a range of subsidies and incentives to encourage 
private investment in strategic industries. See generally ALICE AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH 
KOREA AND LATER INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989). 
 87  Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. 
J. INT’L. L. 373, 390 (1998).  
 88  Lisa Sachs & Karl Sauvant, BITs, DTTs and FDI Flows: An Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES 
ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES 
AND INVESTMENT FLOWS xlix (K. Sauvant & L. Sachs eds., 2009). 
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incentives to attract foreign capital into their jurisdictions.89 Even for those 
developing states that remained skeptical of the merits of the market model, 
the ideological structural adjustment policies imposed on them by the Bretton 
Woods institutions left many of them with little alternative but to liberalize 
their domestic economies.90 
The constellation of these various factors drove explosive growth in in-
vestment treaty-making throughout the 1990s. State parties had concluded a 
relatively modest 385 BITs in the 30 years from 1959 to 1989.91 In compari-
son, 1857 BITs were concluded in the next ten years.92 With this dramatic 
expansion of the BIT network, José Alvarez has argued that “[t]he 1990s, not 
the 1980s and certainly not the 1970s, were the era when the modern invest-
ment regime was born.”93 Not surprisingly then, we began to see a range of 
individual ASEAN states also beginning to accelerate their entry into BITs 
during this period. While ASEAN members sporadically used BITs during 
the 1960s to 1980s, there was significant exponential growth and clustering 
of BIT activity throughout the 1990s.94 Generally speaking, though, there 
was stability in the underlying form and structure of treaty making by indi-
vidual ASEAN states as the basic features of the classic BIT model continue 
to be replicated in this fertile growth period. Put differently, the core DNA 
within BITs created by capital-exporting states—national and most-favored-
nation treatment, the amorphous guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, 
the obligation to compensate for direct and indirect expropriation and inves-
tor-state arbitration—appear with regularity throughout most of the BITs en-
tered into by individual ASEAN members. Yet underlying this general de-
gree of conformity is a highly distinct degree of conservatism within specific 
elements of Asian investment treaty practice. 
In tandem with the neoliberal Zeitgeist, by the mid-1980s, the ASEAN 
states had begun the process of constructing a dedicated ASEAN treaty on 
foreign investment. The negotiations towards the 1987 ASEAN Agreement 
for Promotion and Protection of Investments95 (1987 ASEAN Agreement) 
 
 89  See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (1996). 
 90  ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER, 317–21 (2001). 
 91  U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959–
1999 1 (2000). 
 92  Id. 
 93  José Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 607 (M. Arasanjani et. al. eds., 
2010).  
 94  Beth Simmons, East Asia, Investment and International Law: Distinctive or Convergent?, 13(3) 
KOR. J. INT’L. STUD. 461, 469–71 (2015) (outlining the “timing of Asia’s [international investment agree-
ments]”); see also Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Dif-
fusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000 60 INT. ORG. 811, 821 (2006).  
 95  Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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coincided with the fertile period of BIT-making by individual ASEAN mem-
ber states. Unsurprisingly then, the strategic direction and tenor of those BITs 
have clearly influenced this early iteration of the ASEAN investment project. 
Most visibly, there is a distinct shift from earlier (state-driven) assumptions 
that the ASEAN parties can or should control the factors leading to the es-
tablishment of industrial economic activity. It is certainly true that “acceler-
ation of industrialization of the region” remains as a core objective in the 
1987 ASEAN Agreement. But there is now explicit recognition that freer 
“flow of private investments” is the preferred mechanism to achieve that 
goal.96 
Yet there is a clear mismatch between this new normative direction (of 
facilitating greater flow of foreign investment within ASEAN) and the sub-
stantive content of the obligations within the 1987 ASEAN Agreement. This 
tension illustrates the limits of Lockean cooperation in given settings. On 
scope of operation for instance, the definition of covered investment encom-
passes a wide variety of foreign capital extending beyond FDI to less perma-
nent sources including debt capital and portfolio investment.97 The latter 
would become a focal point for dissatisfaction by key ASEAN members in 
the aftermath of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, feeding eventually into 
key changes to the ASEAN investment treaty landscape. But even at this 
early stage, the new ASEAN investment treaty offered a far more restrictive 
standard of protection than most (although not all) BITs entered into by in-
dividual ASEAN members. In particular, there is a distinct ambivalence to 
the lauded goal of ensuring free operation of foreign capital within the 
ASEAN grouping. The substantive treaty obligations only apply if an 
ASEAN member has “specifically approved in writing” and “registered” an 
investment, upon which it can impose “such conditions as it deems fit for the 
purposes of this Agreement”.98 Strict threshold conditions of this sort are cer-
tainly at play in the BIT practice of certain ASEAN members (including In-
donesia and Thailand) but others (such as the Philippines) offer a far more 
liberal admission regime in their BITs.99 The framers then have thus chosen 
to elevate into the collective sphere the most restrictive mechanism in oper-
 
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987 [hereinafter 1987 ASEAN Agreement]. 
 96  Id. Preambular Recitals 2 and 3.  
 97  Id. art. I(3).  
 98  Id. art. II(1).  
 99  Dato’ Cecil Abraham, State Approval in South East Asian Bilateral Investment Treaties, in 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: LESSONS FOR ASIA 123 (M. Moser ed., 2008) (on the differences in ad-
missions clauses in BITs concludes by these various South East Asian countries); see also Ignacio Gómez-
Palacio & Peter Muchlinski, Admission and Establishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 227 (P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino & C. Schreuer eds., 2008).  
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ation across the entire suite of individual BITs entered into by ASEAN mem-
bers.100 
Strict threshold conditions of this sort theoretically offer ASEAN mem-
bers an important flexibility to vet and control their exposure to investment 
disciplines. Yet, it may well be that the balance is tilted too far in favour of 
the host state vis-à-vis foreign investors. This precondition to legal coverage 
in the 1987 ASEAN Investment Agreement was examined in some detail in 
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v Myanmar. The Tribunal in that case de-
clined jurisdiction precisely because the claimant was unable to prove that its 
existing investment (which had received earlier acceptance by Myanmar un-
der domestic law) had been officially approved in writing at the time the 1987 
ASEAN Agreement came into operation.101 Yet Myanmar had not at that 
time implemented such a formal process of investment approval (for the spe-
cific purposes of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement) making it simply impossible 
for the claimant to discharge this burden. Outside of the ASEAN context, 
certain arbitral tribunals have criticized the way in which formalized precon-
ditions of this sort “advance no real interest of either signatory State” and 
“constitute an artificial trap depriving investors of the very protection the BIT 
was intended to provide.”102 
But even assuming this artificial and highly restrictive threshold condi-
tion is met, the remaining substantive provisions of the 1987 ASEAN instru-
ment offer little promise of meaningful market access for flows of intra-
ASEAN investment. Like most of the BITs entered into by the ASEAN mem-
bers, those substantive obligations only apply on a post-admission basis. In 
other words, the sensitive determination of when and under what conditions 
foreign investment from one ASEAN member may enter the economy of an-
other ASEAN member is purely a question for the latter to decide in exercise 
of full sovereignty. However, there is a fundamental and inexplicable omis-
sion in the 1987 ASEAN Agreement compared to that universe of BITs, even 
when the latter are also operating on a more conservative post-admission ba-
sis. There is no targeted obligation103 on ASEAN members to extend national 
treatment to foreign investors and investments from another ASEAN state 
 
 100 Along these lines, when ruling on this part of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement, the Yaung Chi Oo v. 
Myanmar Tribunal expressly noted that “[t]he 1987 Agreement was thus subject to important limitations 
in terms of its coverage, as compared with other bilateral and multilateral investment protection treaties.” 
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB 01/1, 42 
ILM 540, ¶ 23 (2003). 
 101 Id. at paras. 60–62.  
 102 Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 106 
(Feb. 6, 2008). 
 103 To be sure, there is a provision constraining “unjustified or discriminatory measures” in Article 
IV(1) of the 1987 Agreement. However, it is highly likely that this was not intended to operate as a guar-
antee of national treatment in the sense of requiring members to extend equal competitive opportunities 
to foreign investors because the ASEAN member explicitly reserve the question of national treatment 
protection for future negotiation under Article IV(4). See 1987 ASEAN Agreement supra note 95. 
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(which are typically present in almost all Asian BITs).104 
The absence of national treatment (even on a post-admission basis) is 
deeply problematic from an economic perspective. Such an obligation en-
sures that an ASEAN member extends equal competitive opportunity to for-
eign investment established in accordance with domestic entry laws. Put dif-
ferently, it precludes an ASEAN state from intervening in the domestic 
economy (whether through tax or regulation) in such a way as to intentionally 
advantage domestic actors to the detriment of competing foreign investors 
(from another ASEAN state). Without such a guarantee, the most efficient 
and innovative (foreign) producers could be precluded from serving custom-
ers in the host state’s market where there is successful protectionist lobbying 
of regulators by the competing domestic industry. Consumers would suffer 
as a result when denied the benefits of lower prices, greater product variety 
and/or higher service quality where provided by foreign investors. National 
treatment has a critical role in establishing a fundamental liberal guarantee 
against protectionism, as evidenced in its common employment across the 
suite of BITs entered into by individual ASEAN members. This omission in 
the 1987 ASEAN Agreement thus evidences a highly significant variance in 
strategic focus to those BITs. Liberalization of investment restrictions is 
simply not something that the ASEAN members as a collectivity were able 
or prepared to commit to in 1987. Their collective focus instead was simply 
and only one of investment protection. These elements are characteristic of a 
weak integrationist identity represented by the AIR in the 1980–1990s. Put 
simply, at this stage, the AIR was barely a community. 
The investment protection provisions of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement 
closely track and mirror the strong BITs characteristic of this period (and the 
preferences of the Bretton Woods institutions). Thus, there are the usual 
clauses obliging an ASEAN member to pay adequate compensation where 
engaging in (direct or indirect) expropriation of foreign investment.105 Simi-
larly, the 1987 ASEAN Investment Agreement obliges members to extend 
“fair and equitable treatment” whose content, in line with treaty practice in 
the 1980s, is left undefined and ambiguous.106 The 1987 instrument also ex-
tends a strong treaty right for foreign investors to repatriate their capital and 
earnings, subject only to the national laws of the ASEAN state from which 
transfers were to be made.107 This too is an area in which later parts of the 
ASEAN investment project would diverge significantly especially as mem-
bers digested the lessons and implications of the 1997–1998 Asian financial 
 
 104 Instead, the ASEAN members simply reserve the possibility for future bilateral or multilateral 
commitments on national treatment to be struck under the framework of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement: 
“Any two or more of the Contracting Parties may negotiate to accord national treatment within the frame-
work of the Agreement.” 1987 ASEAN Agreement, supra note 95, art. IV(4).  
 105 Id. art. VI. 
 106 Id. art. IV(2).  
 107 Id. art. VII. 
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crises. 
The analysis so far has identified a set of stringent protective obligations 
imposed on ASEAN members. To put this slightly differently, the many con-
straints on state action directed at foreign investment are not balanced in any 
significant way by flexibilities that would permit state regulation in key areas 
of public interest. In this respect, the 1987 ASEAN Investment Agreement 
matches most of the investment law universe at play in the 1980s, which 
stands in contrast to the law of the WTO.108 In the latter, there has always 
been a set of important exceptions for state regulation to pursue key public 
objectives that had been formalized at inception of the GATT 1947. These 
mechanisms reflect a set of shared social purposes among the membership 
that, as John Ruggie argued, has led to historical norm-governed change 
within the dictates of the system rather than an irretrievable decline in multi-
lateralism (given the slow erosion of the United States as a dominant 
hegemon over time).109 
Of course, the absence of exceptions is not the only significant departure 
from the WTO model in the 1987 ASEAN Investment Agreement. Dispute 
settlement in the WTO is reserved for state parties with a complex set of 
procedures formalized within the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
By contrast, there is no dedicated or specialized institution to monitor state 
compliance with the 1987 ASEAN investment instrument. Perhaps reflecting 
the ASEAN’s then-rudimentary nature as an interstate negotiating forum to 
advance economic cooperation (in line with a Lockean conception), state-to-
state disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 1987 instru-
ment were to be “settled amicably between the parties” and failing settle-
ment, were simply to be “reported to the ASEAN Economic Ministers.”110 
Yet we are then faced with a fundamental disjuncture with the harder and 
formalized mechanisms to resolve disputes between foreign investors (as 
non-state actors) and member states under the 1987 ASEAN Agreement. 
Once again, the influence of the universe of BITs entered into by individual 
ASEAN members (and by extension, the Bretton Woods institutions) is ap-
parent and explains this discrepancy. In line with standard BIT practice by 
the 1980s, the 1987 ASEAN Agreement extends standing to foreign investors 
(from an ASEAN state) who could bring a complaint against a signatory 
(ASEAN) member for breach of the treaty which could be ultimately re-
solved by arbitration whose outcome would be “binding” as a matter of treaty 
obligation.111 Although used relatively sparsely in the future, the few cases 
 
 108 SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL 
TRADING SYSTEM (2003) (discussing the GATT/WTO’s legal and institutional arrangement for legitimate 
public objectives). 
 109 John Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism and Postwar Economic Regimes, in CONSTRUCTING THE 
WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 82–83 (1998). 
 110 1987 ASEAN Agreement, supra note 95, art. X. 
 111 Id. art. X.  
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brought against individual ASEAN members (both under their BITs and the 
1987 ASEAN Agreement) would eventually usher in treaty change based on 
the reasoning and outcome of those particular disputes. There seems then to 
be a selective learning effect from these BIT experiences. While the 1987 
ASEAN Agreement adopted the investor-state investment arbitration mech-
anism, the Agreement was not as open as those individual BITs in key sub-
stantive areas of investor protection and investment liberalization, especially 
national treatment. This partly explains why there were so few disputes that 
arose under the early collective ASEAN rules. The general orientation of the 
regime closely mirrors the strongly pro-state decisions (especially on juris-
diction) made by certain arbitral tribunals. 
In sum, during the 1980–1990s the AIR grew out of the earlier Hobbes-
ian mutual suspicion and embraced a neoliberal identity as the ASEAN’s 
global partners disabused the ASEAN economies of an outmoded develop-
ment model, such as import substitution. The 1987 ASEAN Agreement pro-
vided the AIR with an operable organizational avenue in expanding intra-
ASEAN investment flows. Nonetheless, the AIR during this period betrayed 
the limits of Lockean cooperation. Indeed, an ethos of intra-ASEAN invest-
ment was preceded by zeal for deep extra-ASEAN investment evidenced by 
a dense web of BITs between individual members of ASEAN and other de-
veloped countries. Markedly, extra-ASEAN capital flow dwarfed intra-
ASEAN flows during the BIT growth period of the mid- to late-1990s. This 
puzzling irony, which might be dubbed “reverse open regionalism,” elo-
quently demonstrated the embedded rivalry among members of the AIR 
fueled by protectionist (mercantilist) competition. 
 
Table 1: ASEAN Net FDI on a Balance of Payments Basis 1995–1999 








ASEAN FDI in 
Total ASEAN 
FDI 
1995 4,653.0 16,668.0 21,321.0 21.8% 
1996 2,777.7 23,238.4 26,061.0 10.7% 
1997 5,537.05 22,597.5 28,135.0 19.7% 
1998 2,019.8 17,575.2 19,595.0 10.3% 
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 C. The Identity Crisis: The Asian Financial Crisis and the Rise of 
China 
According to Erickson, at the final stage of identity formation, adoles-
cents suffer from serious role confusion as they become exposed to a new, 
broadened horizon (environment).113 Their pre-established identification 
comes under question in the face of newly discovered challenges and oppor-
tunities. Only after they weather this “war within themselves,”114 adolescents 
may build a genuine sense of direction and unearth their suitable place in the 
society that they belong to.115 Erikson believed that this “identity crisis” is a 
rite of passage that is necessary for adolescents to develop a unique yet co-
herent whole (identity).116 If we apply this notion of crisis to an ICR’s identity 
formation, we may locate certain significant events or developments that 
compel a given ICR to rethink its earlier identification or organizational goal. 
The AIR’s expansionist reform in the 1980–1990s, albeit limited and 
incremental, attests to its neoliberal identity formation. In this period, the 
AIR’s organizational identity may be described as a loosely-knitted ICR that 
still retains an intergovernmental nature, albeit with common functional 
goals, such as expansion of scope of liberalization and reduction of transac-
tion costs. A member of AIR tends to perceive another member as a rival, if 
not an enemy, in a potentially competitive relationship, rather than as a fellow 
in a highly-integrated community.117 Nonetheless, two colossal external 
shocks—the Asian financial crisis and the rise of China as a common 
threat—forced the AIR to rethink and modify its earlier identity toward 
deeper integration and community-building among its members. 
First, over the course of 1997 to 1998, the Asian financial crisis wreaked 
havoc with the economies of some of the world’s most successful perform-
ers.118 Its massive shockwave dealt a blow to its main economies, in particu-
lar Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.119 Capital inflows into 
the region had fueled rapid credit expansion, which lowered the quality of 
credit and led to asset price inflation. Highly leveraged corporate sectors and 
large, unhedged short-term debt made the crisis countries deeply vulnerable 
 
 113 Erikson, supra note 49, at 163–64. 
 114 Erikson, supra note 46, at 17. 
 115 Erikson, supra note 49, at 161. 
 116 Erikson, supra note 46, at 16. 
 117 Wendt, supra note 29, at 250. 
 118 For a comprehensive overview of the causes of and responses to the crisis, see CARL-JOHAN 
LINDGREN, TOMAS BALINO, CHARLES ENOCK, ANNE-MARIE GULDE, MARC QUINTYN & LESLIE TEO, 
FINANCIAL SECTOR CRISIS AND RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM ASIA (1999). 
 119 Andrew McIntyre, Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast 
Asia, 55 INT’L ORG. 81 (2001); see Diane A. Desierto, Investment Treaties: ASEAN, in ASIA RISING: 
GROWTH AND RESILIENCE IN AN UNCERTAIN GLOBAL ECONOMY 184 (H. Hill & M. Gochoco-Bautista 
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to changes in market sentiment. Weaknesses in bank and corporate govern-
ance exacerbated excessive risk-taking, as prudential regulations were lim-
ited or poorly enforced. The crisis was ultimately triggered by the floating of 
the Thai baht in July 1997. Changing expectations led to the depreciation of 
most other currencies throughout the region, bank runs, rapid withdrawals of 
foreign private capital, and dramatic economic downturns. 
The collective nature of the crisis (a “regional” crisis) gave a sense of 
bonding among ASEAN members as they suffered the crisis together.120 
Also, after the crisis they had to respond to a common demand from foreign 
investors—and the Bretton Woods institutions—including invasive regula-
tory reform toward a more investor-friendly environment.121 More im-
portantly, however, the ASEAN economies advanced the AIR itself into a 
more integrative format so as to dramatically augment intra-ASEAN invest-
ment flow. In this line, the Second Informal ASEAN Summit held in Kuala 
Lumpur in December 1997 decided to expedite the implementation of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area as well as the formation of the ASEAN Investment 
Area.122 
Second, the rise of China and the consequential threat it poses to the 
ASEAN region as a main competitor in the global export market also pushed 
the ASEAN members into deeper economic integration. As a striking exam-
ple, consider the fact that for the past three decades the ASEAN region has 
been a popular investment destination for most computer components as it 
has become the world’s second largest exporter of those components.123 Re-
cently, however, China, as the world’s largest computer assembler, chal-
lenged ASEAN’s hitherto dominant position in the production of computer 
components as it benefited from competitive edges in labor, local suppliers, 
and transportation.124 As a result, between 2004 and 2008 ASEAN’s share of 
global computer parts export remained unchanged at 20%, while China’s 
share increased from 27% to 35%.125 Likewise, China has surpassed ASEAN, 
by high margins, as a major FDI destination in Asia in the past decade. While 
FDI to ASEAN and FDI to China accounted for 66% and 16% of total FDI 
to Asia in 1990, respectively, these two numbers were exactly reversed in 
2003.126 
 
 120 See Ralph Emmers, Southeast Asia’s New Security Institutions, in ASIA’S NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE: EVOLVING STRUCTURES FOR MANAGING TRADE, FINANCIAL, AND SECURITY 
RELATIONS 201 (V. K. Aggarwal & M. G. Koo eds. 2008) (viewing that the Asian financial crisis revealed 
the ASEAN’s institutional frailty). 
 121 Edmund R. Thompson, ASEAN After the Financial Crisis, ASEAN ECON. BULL. 1 (2000).  
 122 Suthad Setboonsarng, ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Adjusting to the Crisis, SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
AFF. 35 (1998).  
 123 CHARLOTTE R. LANE ET AL., ASEAN: REGIONAL TRENDS IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, EXPORT 
COMPETITIVENESS, AND INBOUND INVESTMENT FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES 49 (USITC 2010). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 51. 
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With these significant external shocks, the AIR could no longer main-
tain its simple pre-crisis identity as a loose ICR. It was forced to adapt to the 
post-financial crisis environment and locate a new engine for regional eco-
nomic development.127 At the same time, the AIR needed to check the rise of 
China. The AIR identified its solution in the intensification of intra-ASEAN 
investment flow allowing it to build sufficient scale and capacity to meet the 
new Chinese competitive threat. Obviously, this meant a dilemma over its 
long-standing legacy of the Lockean (mercantilist) competition among 
ASEAN economies. To the AIR, this was a central moment of identity crisis. 
 D. The Kantian Project in the Post-Crisis Era? 
These dramatic environmental factors, such as the Asian financial crisis 
and the rise of China, forced ASEAN and the AIR to search for a new inte-
grationist identity. The shared challenge begot the shared response. ASEAN 
economies realized that the erstwhile Lockean cooperation tinged with ri-
valry would no longer constitute a sustainable institutional arrangement gov-
erning their investment flows in and out of the ASEAN region. Instead, re-
gional integration via an augmented intra-ASEAN investment foundation 
and attendant economic community-building surfaced as a new solution.128 
While the old identity of the AIR in the 1980–1990s may have operated as 
an agent of ASEAN economies to help them achieve a limited functional goal 
of facilitating intra-ASEAN investment, the postcrisis AIR has begun to 
morph into a trustee role with a deeper integrationist telos.129 As discussed 
above, a constructivist lens can capture this new identity.130 A strong collec-
tive bond among ASEAN economies with a shared goal of building an 
ASEAN investment community has heralded an aspiration for a Kantian fu-
ture in the ASEAN region.131 
 
 127 See Robert J. R. Elliott & Kengo Ikemoto, AFTA and the Asian Crisis: Help or Hindrance to 
ASEAN Intra-Regional Trade?, 18 ASIAN ECON. J. 1, 17 (2004) (finding that the Asian financial crisis 
prompted a strong aspiration among ASEAN countries to increase intra-ASEAN trade). 
 128 Consider the first preambular recital of the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area: “Affirming the importance of sustaining economic growth and development in all Member States 
through joint efforts in liberalising trade and promoting intra-ASEAN trade and investment flows en-
shrined in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co-operation signed in Singapore 
on 28 January 1992” (emphasis added). 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area 
[hereinafter 1998 Framework Agreement], signed Oct. 7, 1998, Recital 1.  
 129 See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of 
States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 186 (2010). 
 130 See Amitav Acharya, Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Pro-
spects for Peaceful Change, in ASIAN SECURITY ORDER: INSTRUMENTAL AND NORMATIVE FEATURES 
211-12 (Muthiah Alagappa ed. 2003) (arguing that the ASEAN security community could be better un-
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on power and interest). 
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If we consider the construction of ASEAN investment rules in the post-
crisis era, we can identify both internal and external influences that have 
shaped the contours of that project. As we have seen, at the internal level, the 
pre-existing BITs of individual ASEAN member states have continued to 
play a role in shaping collective treaty choice within ASEAN as a grouping. 
Given these foundations, it is perhaps understandable that the earliest stage 
of the ASEAN investment project—the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments—reflected a conservative BIT-style 
project of only delivering investment protection. Put differently, liberaliza-
tion of restrictions on entry and operation of foreign investment was a mar-
ginal element of early ASEAN investment rules. But with late-1990s trigger-
ing external crises facing the ASEAN grouping, the normative direction of 
the ASEAN investment project had pointedly reversed. Now under the 1998 
ASEAN Investment Area, the ASEAN members had committed to strategi-
cally position the region as a single production base (as a means of countering 
the strategic threat posed by China), and foreign investment was a core com-
ponent of that strategy. A single production base would supply ASEAN prod-
ucts for consumption not just in the region but also for export to elsewhere 
in the world. Foreign investment is a key driver of production networks that 
are so central to this vibrant aspect of the contemporary global economy. 
Large-scale foreign investment will locate different stages of a production 
process across different countries so as to achieve key efficiencies by mini-
mizing overall production cost. Efficiency-seeking foreign investment “is by 
its very nature trade-creating” because “[b]y subdividing the production pro-
cess in vertical stages between countries, trade is obviously created (com-
pared to the situation where all stages are undertaken in one country).”132 
This is no minor or tangential economic fact. Approximately half of the 
world’s trade today takes place between affiliates of multinational enterprises 
trading intermediate goods and services.133 The potential benefits of using 
foreign investment to position ASEAN as an integrated production base are 
thus remarkably extensive, including the possibility of higher employment, 
wages, and overall development throughout the region. 
We can plainly trace these momentous shifts in legal framing and posi-
tioning in the new set of collective investment rules in ASEAN. A funda-
mental objective of the 1998 Framework Agreement is the establishment of 
“a competitive ASEAN Investment Area” (AIA),134 indicating a strategic de-
sire to position the region as an alternative host of foreign investment that 
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would normally flow elsewhere (not least China). The means chosen to 
achieve this strategic goal are naturally different from the purely investment 
protective focus of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement. The AIR’s new identity 
represented by the AIA now overcame Lockean limits under its old identity 
in the 1980–1990s. Now member states would commit to a “more liberal and 
transparent investment environment” that would “substantially increase the 
flow of investments . . . from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”135 
This strong liberalization mandate was matched by an exceedingly ambitious 
timeframe whereby: 
(b) national treatment is extended to ASEAN investors by 2010, and 
to all investors by 2020, subject to the exceptions provided for 
under this Agreement; 
(c) all industries are opened for investment to ASEAN investors by 
2010 and to all investors by 2020, subject to the exceptions pro-
vided for under this Agreement.136 
The remaining substantive provisions operationalize the core commit-
ment to investment liberalization of the ASEAN members, at least when it 
comes to flows of FDI within and among ASEAN states. Most fundamen-
tally, each ASEAN member commits in Article 7(1) to: 
(a)  [O]pen immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN 
Investors; 
(b)  [A]ccord immediately to ASEAN investors and their invest-
ments, in respect of all industries and measures affecting invest-
ment including but not limited to the admission, establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, operation and disposition 
of investments, treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
to its own like investors and investments (“national treat-
ment”).137 
Compared to the conservative post-establishment orientation of the 
1987 ASEAN Instrument (as well as almost all of the BITs of individual 
ASEAN members), the 1998 Framework Agreement now dramatically liber-
alizes restrictions on entry of foreign investment. The significant and valua-
ble promise of market access in Article 7(1)(a) is especially remarkable as it 
precludes an ASEAN member from reserving any industry to participation 
only by that state or its state-owned entities. The promise of national treat-
ment in Article 7(1)(b) also prevents an ASEAN member from restricting 
operation in a given industry to domestic private actors. Given the political 
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challenges associated with this ambitious commitment to investment liberal-
ization, it is unsurprising that the 1998 Framework Agreement provides for 
a degree of flexibility in meeting these obligations. ASEAN members are 
permitted to submit Temporary Exclusion Lists and Sensitive Lists, which 
specify the industries or sectors that would not be opened up to investment 
or for which the ASEAN member could not confer national treatment.138 For 
most ASEAN members, the negative list exemptions (in the Temporary List) 
were to be reviewed biennially and phased out by 2010.139 
Interestingly, it is at this point that we see the challenges faced by the 
newer least-developed members of ASEAN find reflection as a matter of le-
gal architecture.  This too vividly illustrates the communal facets of the AIR. 
Vietnam and Laos are granted special and differential treatment in the form 
classically provided in the law of the WTO. These newer member states of 
ASEAN are given a staggered period of compliance with progressive phase-
out of their Temporary List to be concluded by 2015.140 This is by no means 
a small or incidental change. Within investment law, the usual and strongly 
held assumption across most BITs is that developing states should be fully 
responsible for weaknesses in governance structures where these constitute 
wrongful harm to a foreign investor, rather than the WTO-based notion that 
development status might variegate the depth of a given international law 
commitment. It is also important to recall that the ASEAN members can sub-
mit an entirely separate Sensitive List (to the Temporary List) excluding 
themselves from the immediate obligation to open their economies to invest-
ment from other ASEAN members. And when it comes to such a Sensitive 
List, there is no hard phase-out contemplated, with the AIA simply providing 
that it “shall be reviewed by 1 January 2003 and at such subsequent periodic 
intervals as may be decided by the AIA Council.”141 
This hard promise of liberalization of entry restrictions to intra-ASEAN 
capital flows – even when accompanied by the possibility of negative list 
exemptions – has real potential to contribute to the key articulated goal of the 
construction of a competitive AIA that would “substantially increase the flow 
of investments into ASEAN.”142 In recent years, there have been multiple 
empirical studies that have sought to identify whether there is a causal rela-
tionship between state entry into BITs and an increase in inbound foreign 
investment.143 This early empirical literature was characterized by methodo-
logical weakness in that investment treaties were treated as black boxes. 
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More recent empirical research has however disaggregated treaties based on 
form and content. It now appears that the specific content of investment trea-
ties matters a very great deal in attracting foreign investment. And of all the 
various provisions in investment treaties, pre-establishment market access 
(via national treatment) offers the greatest potential for increasing foreign 
investment flows. One study has estimated that a host country can increase 
its share in total FDI flows by almost 30% in the hypothetical case of switch-
ing from particular investment treaties without pre-establishment national 
treatment commitments to those with such provisions.144  
The analysis so far has focused on the valuable, crystallized obligation 
of an ASEAN member in Article 7 to extend market access to FDI from an-
other ASEAN member state. Yet, the broader articulated goal within the 
Framework Agreement was to “substantially increase the flow of invest-
ments into ASEAN from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”145 On close 
observation however, there is a fundamental difference in treatment of in-
vestment from ASEAN states compared to investment from non-ASEAN, 
external sources. Article 7 of the 1998 Framework Agreement maps in some 
detail the “2010 promise” of free movement of capital within ASEAN. By 
contrast to this extended and nuanced treatment of investment flows within 
the ASEAN grouping, there are far fewer provisions directed at inflows of 
capital from sources external to the ASEAN members. For one thing, there 
is nothing within the actual text of the AIA designed to clearly crystallize the 
2020 promise. Instead, Schedule III simply provides that member states shall 
implement “individual action plans” to meet that goal. Taken at face value 
(in the sense that the 2020 promise is formally structured as a hard legal ob-
ligation), this suggests a paradoxical distrust of intra-ASEAN investment 
compared to investment from other sources (given the abundant discretion to 
create exemption lists for the former). More realistically perhaps, the 2020 
promise of opening up ASEAN to external capital might have been intended 
as an aspirational goal rather than a reflection of a fundamental sense of legal 
commitment. 
That characterization is also confirmed by the manner in which the 
ASEAN members have sought to preserve the integrity of the valuable prom-
ise to only extend market access to investment from other ASEAN states. 
Before an economic actor can take the benefit of the newly liberalized 
ASEAN Investment Area (under the terms of the Framework Agreement), 
they must first meet the strict definition of an “ASEAN investor.”146 This 
encompasses a national or juridical person of any ASEAN Member State, 
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who makes “an investment in another Member State, the effective ASEAN 
equity of which taken cumulatively with all other ASEAN equities fulfills at 
least the minimum percentage required to meet the national equity require-
ment and other equity requirements of domestic laws and published national 
policies, if any, of the host country in respect of that investment.”147 “Effec-
tive ASEAN equity” in turn is defined as the “ultimate holdings by nationals 
or juridical persons of ASEAN Member States in that investment,” without 
the treaty prescribing the legal test applicable to determine such “ultimate 
holdings.” Instead, the 1998 Framework Agreement prioritizes the ASEAN 
member state’s national rules and procedures for ascertaining such “effective 
equity.” This positioning explicitly entitles an ASEAN host state to use its 
own laws to trace through the ownership structure of a given investment to 
guarantee that ultimate equity is held by ASEAN nationals or companies. 
Obviously, this emphasis on intra-ASEAN investment over extra-ASEAN 
investment prominently reverses the earlier trend (reverse open regionalism) 
typified by strategic considerations driven by neorealist suspicion or by ne-
oliberal calculation. 
The latest iteration of ASEAN investment treaty practice is the 2009 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which builds and 
deepens this communal orientation.148 First, the ACIA goes beyond the stand-
ard purposes of either investment liberalization or protection that had domi-
nated the positioning of the earlier (1987 and 1998) ASEAN instruments.149 
We now have a clearer understanding of the precise orientation and function 
of the AIR. The AIR now embraces a new identity (community) with a strong 
integrationist telos. In the preamble for instance, the member states envisage 
a “more integrated and interdependent future,”150 and they then offer a clue 
as to how that goal is to be translated via a specific objective of the ACIA. 
“Economic integration” is to be achieved, inter alia, through “joint promo-
tion of the region as an integrated investment area.”151 This language draws 
down directly from the commitments struck by the ASEAN members in the 
2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (“AEC Blueprint”) to build 
“an ASEAN single market and production base” comprising free flow of 
goods and services as well as free movement of certain factors of production 
including capital.152 Strikingly, the AEC Blueprint on foreign investment 
seeks to position ASEAN as an “integrated investment area and production 
network” by, for example, promoting “industrial complementation and pro-
duction networks among MNCs in ASEAN” and “joint investment missions 
 
 147 Id. art. 1 (emphasis added). 
 148 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009 [hereinafter ACIA]. 
 149 Id. art. 2(a).  
 150 Id. at Recital 2.  
 151 Id. art. 1(d). 
 152 ASEAN, 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, para. 9 (adopted Nov. 20, 2007), 
http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf.  
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that focus on regional clusters and production networks”.153 This core lan-
guage is then repeated as a distinct legal obligation in the ACIA.154 What we 
have now is a deliberate focus on attracting one key type of foreign invest-
ment—efficiency-seeking FDI that would construct supply chains across the 
region—to achieve both a given level of economic integration and a means 
of fulfilling the 1998 Framework Agreement’s objective of developing a 
competitive AIA. 
Secondly, since the last investment instrument, Cambodia acceded to 
ASEAN joining Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam as the least-developed mem-
bers. Not surprisingly then, “development” continues to be articulated as a 
central value of the ASEAN investment treaty project. Unlike the earlier in-
struments, however, the negotiators of the ACIA have explicitly laid down 
those core purposes of the treaty in a set of objectives155 and guiding princi-
ples.156 Those specific objectives and principles supplement the general ex-
pressions of purpose in the preambular recitals to the ACIA. The former are 
especially important when one considers the taxonomy of treaty interpreta-
tion mandated by Article 31(1) of the VCLT. The ACIA negotiators have 
offered adjudicators rich tableaux to assist them in understanding the telos of 
the ACIA, with “development” now key to parts of the ACIA project. Recital 
2 of the preamble explicitly recognizes “the different levels of development 
within ASEAN especially the least developed Member States which require 
some flexibility including special and differential treatment as ASEAN 
moves towards a more integrated and interdependent future.” The WTO-
based notion that “special and differential treatment” should be accorded to 
states at lower levels of development is then repeated as one of the eight 
guiding principles in Article 2.157 The newly coded undertaking of develop-
ment in the ACIA vividly illustrates the AIR’s collective identity (commu-
nity) in a postcrisis era. 
Thirdly, there is a clear desire to achieve a high degree of refinement 
and sophistication in the legal construction of the ACIA, which engages both 
internal and external dimensions. This phenomenon is perfectly natural when 
we consider the AIR’s evolution into a legal community in which its mem-
bers communicate with one another with legal tools, such as treaties and other 
legal instruments.158 Internally, the ACIA avoids the legal uncertainties in-
herent in the crude scaffolding strategy adopted in the 1998 Framework 
Agreement building upon the earlier 1987 ASEAN instrument.159 On entry 
 
 153 Id. at para. 29.  
 154 ACIA, supra note 148, art. 24(b)–(c).  
 155 Id. art. 1. 
 156 Id. art. 2.  
 157 Id. art. 2(f).  
 158 Cf. SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE: NORMS, COMMUNITY AND 
CONSTITUTION (2015). 
 159 1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 128, art. 12(1). 
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into force of the ACIA, the 1987 and 1998 instruments are terminated, deliv-
ering welcome certainty on the question of when and what legal regime will 
apply.160 But this internal strategy notably extends beyond this single (albeit, 
key) housekeeping maneuver. It also aims to correct the earlier problematic 
pathologies (of both under- and over-protection of foreign investment) that 
had characterized particular choices of legal rules in 1987 and 1998. On the 
external front, the ASEAN members have explicitly sought to develop a 
“comprehensive investment agreement” that is “comparable to international 
best practices.”161 
To that end, there are distinct improvements in legal strategies used in 
the ACIA, embedded in the particular experiences of ASEAN members un-
der the earlier legal structures or as respondents to investor–state arbitration 
(either under the earlier ASEAN investment treaties or individual country 
BITs). For instance, we saw that the broad and undefined approval precondi-
tion to coverage in the 1987 ASEAN instrument could potentially result in 
inappropriate under-protection of foreign investment. The ACIA now de-
fines “covered investment” as investment in an ASEAN member “admitted 
according to its laws, regulations and national policies, and where applicable, 
specifically approved in writing by the competent authority of a Member 
State.”162 The ASEAN members no longer elevate into ASEAN law, the most 
restrictive precondition to coverage (requiring specific approval) in individ-
ual BIT practice (such as that of Indonesia).  Those states that wish to retain 
that strict precondition may do so but for others (such as Singapore and the 
Philippines), compliance with general domestic laws on entry of foreign in-
vestment is a necessary and sufficient condition for ACIA coverage. 
Critically, even for those ASEAN members that adopt the highly restric-
tive approval precondition, they are now subject to due process disciplines. 
The “approval in writing” requirement now provides “[f]or the purpose of 
protection, the procedures relating to specific approval in writing shall be 
specified in Annex 1 (Approval in Writing)”.163 Through Annex 1, ASEAN 
members are required to ensure that their approval procedure is transparent, 
in line with a centrally articulated objective to work towards “improvement 
of transparency and predictability of investment rules, regulations and pro-
cedures conducive to increased investment among Member States”.164 Spe-
cifically, Annex 1 obliges each member: 
 
 160 Despite that termination, the key Temporary Exclusion and Sensitive Lists that delineated individ-
ual member states’ market access obligations continue to apply to the liberalization provisions of the 
ACIA until reservations (under Article 9 of the ACIA) come into force. Further, for a period of three years 
from termination, investors can choose to apply the entirety of any of the three instruments. ACIA, supra 
note 148, art. 47. 
 161 Id. Recital 1.  
 162 Id. art. 4(a).  
 163 Id. art. 4(1), n.1. 
 164 Id. art. 1(c). 
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[w]here specific approval in writing is required for covered invest-
ments by a Member State’s domestic laws, regulations and national 
policies, that Member State shall: 
(a)  inform all the other Member States through the ASEAN Secre-
tariat of the contact details of its competent authority responsible 
for granting such approval; 
(b)  in the case of an incomplete application, identify and notify the 
applicant in writing within 1 month from the date of receipt of 
such application of all the additional information that is required; 
(c)  inform the applicant in writing that the investment has been spe-
cifically approved or denied within 4 months from the date of 
receipt of complete application by the competent authority; and 
(d)  in the case an application is denied, inform the applicant in writ-
ing of the reasons for such denial. The applicant shall have the 
opportunity of submitting, at that applicant’s discretion, a new 
application.165 
Thus where ASEAN members elect to tightly control incoming foreign 
investment from another ASEAN member state (via a “specific approval in 
writing” requirement), they must now provide a foreign investor with distinct 
procedural protections. In fact, these are mandatory requirements to which a 
failure to comply could result in an investor-state challenge. These proce-
dural guarantees represent a fundamental qualitative increase in the sophisti-
cation of the ASEAN investment treaty project because as vividly illustrated 
by the Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar award, some ASEAN states had failed to 
provide a transparent process for approval and could reject incoming invest-
ment without providing reasons.166 Annex 1 largely precludes this self-judg-
ment by requiring a host State to act transparently and provide reasons. 
In sum, AIR’s last (Kantian) stage of organizational development ex-
hibits collective efforts of its members to deepen their integration via an en-
hanced level of investment liberalization and regulatory rationalization. 
Nonetheless, despite these fertile developments, even this stage of coopera-
tion among members is not fully complete. In certain areas, the AIR betrays 




 165 Id. Annex 1.  
 166 Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Myanmar, 42 ILM 540 (2003). 
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Table 2: The Evolutionary Pathway of the ASEAN Investment Regime 
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 IV. A BLAST FROM THE PAST: THE HOBBESIAN RELIC IN 
THE KANTIAN PROJECT 
Despite the significant organizational development of the AIR (from a 
modest investment protection and liberalization arrangement to an ambitious 
investment community), there are countervailing trends. The evolution of 
AIR and its identity-formation process is also partly shaped by strong in-
ward-looking elements in determining various thresholds in regulating in-
vestment inflows. 
Admittedly, part of the reason behind this ostensible regressionism is 
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the Asian financial crisis. On close examination, there were significant (alt-
hough understandable) limitations to the degree of liberalization ushered in 
by the 1998 Framework Agreement. The definitional scope of that Agree-
ment in particular breaks sharply with the usual expansive approach in in-
vestment treaties (of the 1980s and 1990s) that had been largely adopted (col-
lectively or individually) within ASEAN up to this point. The disciplines of 
the Framework Agreement only extended to “direct investments” with “port-
folio investments” and “matters relating to investments covered by other 
ASEAN Agreements, such as the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Ser-
vices” specifically excluded from coverage.167 Thus the member states had 
chosen to confine the 1998 Framework Agreement to FDI whose entry is 
classically understood as a positive input that boosts industrial development 
and job creation. But they have clearly exempted less permanent (and thus 
“sticky”) forms of capital such as minority equity (portfolio) and debt capital 
that, as the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis had sharply demonstrated, are 
prone to sudden reversals or herd behavior that can quickly destabilize finan-
cial systems.168 We have then our first visible manifestation of the profound 
impact of the Asian financial crisis on the legal contours of the ASEAN in-
vestment project. 
Nonetheless, most of these irreversible trends appear deeper and more 
structural than mere (time-limited) reactions from the crisis. These structural 
regressions into sovereigntism, which is often synonymous with protectionist 
measures, may seem to be an aberration from the standpoint of global stand-
ards whose salient trends are ever-expanding investment liberalization com-
mitments. Likewise, one might be tempted to characterize this apparent ret-
rogression as pathology in AIR’s organizational development, particularly in 
terms of AIR’s identity formation. Those who believe that such trends are 
pathological might be inclined to find a persuasive analogy in the notion of 
“encapsulation” in psychoanalysis.169 Early historical traumas, such as colo-
nialism and Konfrontasi, may have left part of AIR’s identity encapsulated 
and therefore largely immune to the subsequent identity formation (collec-
tivization) process. In other words, the historically entrenched survival in-
stinct among ASEAN members may have impeded AIR’s full identity for-
mation, which means lingering sovereigntist, and often protectionist, 
interventions in certain areas of investment liberalization. 
For example, there are immediate questions as to whether the choices 
made by the ASEAN members in the text of the ACIA are likely to give 
 
 167 1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 128, art. 2.  
 168 On the relative stability of FDI compared to the sudden withdrawals of short-term debt capital and 
portfolio investment during both the Mexican peso devaluation of 1994–1995 and the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997–1998, see generally ASAF RAZIN ET AL., SOCIAL BENEFITS AND LOSSES FROM FDI: TWO 
NONTRADITIONAL VIEWS, in REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS (Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger 
eds., Univ. Chicago Press (2001). 
 169 See Hopper, supra note 3.  
  
The Evolution of the ASEAN Investment Regime 
37:173 (2017) 
209 
effect to the critical normative goal of building a competitive and integrated 
production network within the region. As we have seen, the uncertainty in-
herent in a key part of the 1998 Framework Agreement has now been re-
solved. The liberalization obligations in the ACIA apply only to questions of 
intra-ASEAN investment flows. Thus, the seemingly ambitious promise in 
1998 to construct investment rules within ASEAN that would also extend to 
FDI from external sources has been jettisoned. Liberalization now proceeds 
on a dual-track basis with the ACIA only regulating intra-ASEAN capital 
flows while the question of treatment afforded to external foreign investors 
remains subject to both treaties entered into by member states individually 
(including both BITs and investment chapters in FTAs) and the set of re-
gional investment agreements entered into by ASEAN as a grouping with 
key partners such as China, Australia, and New Zealand.170 
Yet even when applied only to intra-ASEAN capital flows, the commit-
ment to liberalize restrictions on admission of foreign investment in the 
ACIA is far less comprehensive than that set out in the earlier 1998 Frame-
work Agreement. To be sure, ASEAN’s conservative strategy in 1998 of only 
covering FDI has been jettisoned in the ACIA in favor of a broad asset-based 
definition of “investment” which pointedly includes debt capital in the form 
of bonds and debentures.171 But the market access obligations in the 1998 
Framework Agreement also required, inter alia, each member state to “open 
immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN investors,” subject 
to the ability to impose targeted exemptions.172 By contrast, the ACIA only 
provides: 
For the purpose of liberalization and subject to Article 9 (Reserva-
tions), this Agreement shall apply to the following sectors: 
(a) manufacturing; 
(b)  agriculture; 
(c)  fishery; 
(d)  forestry; 
(e)  mining and quarrying; 
(f)  services incidental to manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, for-
estry, mining and quarrying; and 
(g)  any other sectors as may be agreed upon by all Member States.173 
This reversal from the earlier liberalization obligations is problematic 
when one considers the expressed desire among the member states to build a 
competitive, integrated production base within the ASEAN region. Tradi-
 
 170 For a listing of these treaties, see Diane A. Desierto, Regulatory Freedom and Control in the New 
ASEAN Regional Investment Treaties, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1018, 1018–24 (2015). 
 171 ACIA, supra note 148, art. 4(c)(ii). 
 172 1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 128, art. 7(1)(a) (emphasis added).  
 173 ACIA, supra note 148, art. 3(3).  
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tionally, a select number of manufacturing industries have been at the fore-
front of value chain segmentation, especially the electronics and automotive 
industries where products can be broken down into discrete components that 
can be separately produced, easily transported, and assembled in low-cost 
locations.174 While these gains will be potentially captured by the general 
inclusion of “manufacturing” in the positive list of covered sectors above, it 
is always possible for an individual member state to exempt itself from any 
obligation via a dedicated negative list reservation (under Article 9). An al-
ternative approach would have been to identify and list which specific types 
of manufacturing are critical to building supply chains throughout the 
ASEAN region (while offering far less flexibility to all ASEAN members to 
refuse liberalization obligations in those targeted sectors). Moreover, the re-
maining insertions largely cover primary industries. Yet notably, extractive 
industries rank much lower in value chain segmentation as they require little 
imported content apart from some services.175 There seems then to be a fun-
damental mismatch in the framing of the sectors subject to liberalization ob-
ligations against the overarching strategic goal to build an integrated produc-
tion base within the region. 
Furthermore, from the 1990s onwards, arbitral jurisprudence had tack-
led the thorny issue of precisely what constitutes “foreign investment” for the 
purposes of gaining protection under an applicable treaty or for the select 
purposes of the ICSID Convention. A single arbitrator in the Malaysian Sal-
vors v. Malaysia award had ruled that various criteria needed to be met in 
order for a given asset to fall within the definition of “investment” under the 
ICSID Convention.176 Some of these factors—especially the notion that an 
asset be shown to contribute to the economic development of the host state—
have proven to be deeply controversial. For the most part, the ACIA negoti-
ators have sensibly opted to avoid an approach that confers discretion on an 
adjudicator to make difficult judgments on the nexus between foreign invest-
ment and development outcomes. Instead, they have simply required that ad-
judicators satisfy themselves that an asset take the essential characteristics of 
investment understood as, inter alia, “commitment of capital, the expectation 
of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”177 Nonetheless, these still operate 
as a bounded restriction on free flow of capital at odds with the deeper inte-
gration ethos of the AIR. 
Lastly, there is an omission on substantive protections (compared to ju-
risdictional preconditions) possibly rooted in the particular arbitral experi-
 
 174 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: INVESTMENT AND VALUE ADDED TRADE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (2013). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Ju-
risdiction, ¶ 109-30 (May 17, 2007).  
 177 ACIA, supra note 148, art. 4(c), fn. 2.  
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ence of one of the ASEAN members. In the SGS v Philippines award, a for-
eign investor had sought to use an umbrella clause to convert a claim for 
breach of a contract (entered into with the Philippines) into a treaty dispute, 
despite the fact that the contract featured an exclusive forum clause with all 
disputes to be referred to the Philippine judicial system.178 As it happens, the 
Philippines ultimately succeeded in its defense in that case as the Tribunal 
found the claim to be non-admissible. Yet interestingly, despite that win by 
the Philippines, the ACIA contains no umbrella clause. The reason for that 
omission may come down to the fact that, despite the outcome of the case, 
much of the reasoning employed in SGS v Philippines represented an expan-
sive and often poorly justified interpretation of the underlying function of an 
umbrella clause of any form.  The omission in the ACIA may thus represent 
understandable caution by the ASEAN states to protect themselves against 
this broad interpretation which, if adopted by later tribunals, could render 
carefully negotiated contractual dispute clauses redundant. There are, how-
ever, more tailored options that could have been pursued so as to preserve an 
appropriate degree of foreign investment protection under an umbrella 
clause. For instance, the drafters could have clarified that a breach of the 
umbrella clause may only result from an exercise of sovereign power and not 
from ordinary breach of contract by the state.179 Relatedly, the umbrella 
clause can be used to work in both directions in that it incorporates into the 
investment treaty not only a state’s obligations but also those of an inves-
tor.180 A “two way” umbrella clause of this sort would give host states a right 
to bring counterclaims against investors in investor-state arbitration proceed-
ings. 
In sum, one can still spot Hobbesian vestiges even in the most advanced 
form of AIR and related legal documents, which substantiates the incom-
pleteness of the AIR’s community-building project. This regressionism tends 
to challenge the application of developmental psychology (i.e., identity-for-
mation theory) to AIR. After all, an ICR is a complex social organization and 
therefore its institutional development (evolution) is neither linear nor iso-
morphic. In this regard, path-dependency and cultural diversity (the 
“ASEAN Way”) remain as strong explanatory factors in organizational de-
velopment. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
This article began by conceptualizing the ASEAN Investment Regime 
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(AIR) as an Interstate Cooperative Regime (ICR), defined as a stable inter-
state cooperative nexus on a particular regulative subject, comprising the reg-
ulation of foreign investment in this particular case. It has sought to describe 
and explain the complex evolution of the AIR in terms of its identity for-
mation. To that end, we have employed three ideal types of cultural logic 
(Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian) across each stage of the AIR’s evolution, 
largely overlapping with the three main IR theories of neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism and constructivism respectively. Using those models, we 
have found a clear evolutionary pathway with the AIR following this sequen-
tial trajectory as it has transitioned toward a closer, regional investment com-
munity. 
Importantly, however, this sequential evolution is not always linear and 
non-retrogressive. Indeed, one can still detect Hobbesian relics, such as sov-
ereignty-preserving protectionism, even in the latest and most advanced form 
of AIR. While this regressionism challenges any uncritical application of 
identity-formation theory to AIR, it also eloquently demonstrates that an ICR 
is indeed a complex social organization whose institutional evolution may 
not be isomorphic. To that extent, “path-dependency,” such as the “ASEAN 
Way,” remains as a critical factor in mapping and understanding the nuances 
of AIR’s evolution. 
Finally, the findings and observations made by this article call for future 
research on such issues as organizational heterogeneities in the era of iso-
morphism. While world polity theory may offer a powerful heuristic on iso-
morphism that AIR certainly exhibits to a large degree, certain aspects of 
AIR, such as regressionism, shed critical light on isomorphism’s analytical 
blind spots. 
